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Abstract 
Background: Diagnostic decision-making is made through a combination of Systems 1 (intuition or pattern-
recognition) and Systems 2 (analytic) thinking. The purpose of this study was to use the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) to evaluate and compare the level of Systems 1 and 2 thinking among medical students in pre-clinical and 
clinical programs.  
Methods: The CRT is a three-question test designed to measure the ability of respondents to activate 
metacognitive processes and switch to System 2 (analytic) thinking where System 1 (intuitive) thinking would lead 
them astray. Each CRT question has a correct analytical (System 2) answer and an incorrect intuitive (System 1) 
answer. A group of medical students in Years 2 & 3 (pre-clinical) and Years 4 (in clinical practice) of a 5-year 
medical degree were studied.  
Results: Ten percent (13/128) of students had the intuitive answers to the three questions (suggesting they 
generally relied on System 1 thinking) while almost half (44%) answered all three correctly (indicating full 
analytical, System 2 thinking). Only 3-13% had incorrect answers (i.e. that were neither the analytical nor the 
intuitive responses). Non-native English speaking students (n = 11) had a lower mean number of correct answers 
compared to native English speakers (n = 117: 1.0 s 2.12 respectfully: p < 0.01). As students progressed through 
questions 1 to 3, the percentage of correct System 2 answers increased and the percentage of intuitive answers 
decreased in both the pre-clinical and clinical students.  
Conclusions: Up to half of the medical students demonstrated full or partial reliance on System 1 (intuitive) 
thinking in response to these analytical questions. While their CRT performance has no claims to make as to their 
future expertise as clinicians, the test may be used in helping students to understand the importance of awareness 
and regulation of their thinking processes in clinical practice. 
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Introduction 
Making a diagnosis is central to medical practice. A 
correct diagnosis sets off a chain of events, 
investigations, and therapeutic treatments, that lead 
to appropriate management. This is done through 
clinical reasoning, the “cognitive process that is 
necessary to evaluate and manage a patient’s 
medical problem.”
1
 Some experts estimate that 75% 
of diagnostic failures can be attributed to clinician 
diagnostic thinking failure from multiple causes 
including inadequate knowledge, faulty data 
gathering, and/or faulty verification.
2
 Thus, the 
clinician’s ability to provide safe, high-quality care is 
dependent upon their ability to reason, think, and 
judge. 
Despite the importance placed on patient safety in 
the modern curriculum
3
, medical education at 
present has built an environment that does not 
always actively promote development of clinical 
reasoning. Educators recognize its importance in 
developing expertise, but it is often not an explicit 
educational objective.
4
 Part of this is due to the 
belief that clinical reasoning will be acquired on its 
own over time with practice and an accumulation of 
knowledge.
5
 Norman and Eva
6
 in a systematic review 
of the literature, concluded that strategies directed 
at encouraging both analytical and non-analytical 
reasoning could lead to some gains in diagnostic 
accuracy. Thus, knowing how doctors think, make 
decisions, and make errors in thinking is important 
for novice and expert clinical decision makers, but 
also for educators who will need to have multiple 
strategies to teach both analytical and non-analytical 
reasoning.
7
 
Decision-making is complex. It is partly based on the 
dual-process theory of Epstein and Hammond,
8
 
recently popularized in Daniel Kahneman’s book 
“Thinking Fast and Slow.”
10
 Two families of cognitive 
operations, called System 1 (intuitive) and System 2 
(analytical) thinking, are used in decision-making. 
System 1 thinking is often described as a reflex 
system, which is “intuitive” and “experiential” or 
“pattern recognition”, which triggers an automated 
mode of thinking. It is generated without much 
conscious effort and channels the available 
information through a subconscious pattern 
recognition based on similar past situations;
11,12
 this 
is often described as the “gut feeling”. When 
problems are routine and when under time 
constraint, System 1 kicks in. When an individual is 
more dependent on System 1 thinking (for example, 
HALT: “hungry, angry, tired or late” or under 
conditions of illness, substance abuse or emotional 
distress), the accuracy of decision-making can be 
adversely affected.
14
  Nevertheless, there is evidence 
that System 1 thinking is an indispensable element 
of clinical decision-making in physician primary 
care.
15,16
 Although System 2 (analytical) thinking is 
more deliberate than System 1, the latter is not 
necessarily less capable. On the contrary, complex 
cognitive operations eventually migrate from System 
2 to System 1 (i.e. become more automatic) as 
proficiency and skill are acquired and pattern 
matching has replaced effortful serial processing. 
System 2 is the more “analytical,” “deliberate” and 
“rational” side to the thinking process. It is pieced 
together by logical judgment and a mental search for 
additional information acquired through past 
learning and experience.
17,18
 The data are then 
processed carefully, through a conscious application 
of rules, making it a much slower and cognitively 
demanding process but more likely to lead to better 
decisions. The analytical system is engaged usually 
when there is uncertainty, complexity, or the 
outcomes give little room for error but there is time 
to think.
19,20 
System 2 thinking is slow, requiring 
significant cognitive effort, and, though it is less 
prone to error, is not foolproof.  
Experts, drawing upon greater quantities of 
information within their field, are occasionally 
subject to cognitive errors and biases, by picking up 
the wrong information or “distracting cues”,
 
resulting in diagnostic errors. When used alone, 
System 2 thinking can lead to poorer performance by 
slowing action processes down. Experience, despite 
being a yardstick of the expert, does not necessarily 
translate into better performance. Indeed, 
experience, without feedback or reflection, can 
often be the fertile ground for the development of 
faulty thinking.
21,22 
Thus, Systems 1 and 2 thinking are useful in the right 
place and the right time; indeed, they complement 
each other. Taken together, they promote greater 
efficiency in thinking, decision-making and action, 
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and help bring order to chaos and uncertainty.
23
 
Whether to use Systems 1 or 2 thinking in a given 
clinical situation depends on the complexity of the 
situation in relation to the individual’s capabilities, 
past experiences, and self-confidence. 
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a three-
question test designed to measure respondent’s 
ability to activate metacognitive processes allowing 
them to switch to System 2 thinking. In other words, 
it is the disposition to resist reporting the response 
that first comes to mind.
24
 As explained by the CRT 
inventor Shane Frederick: “The three items on the 
CRT are “easy” in the sense that their solution is 
easily understood when explained, yet reaching the 
correct answer often requires the suppression of an 
erroneous answer that springs “impulsively” to 
mind.”
 
In his study, Frederick has shown a reduction 
in intuitive answers as the questions precede from 
question 1 to 3 and also a gender bias with better 
performance among the male population.
24
 The CRT 
has also been used in a group of judges in the United 
States.
25
 Judges are thought to be predominantly 
intuitive thinkers, picking up on intuitive clues that 
lead them to reach conclusions that they later 
rationalize. This study showed that only two thirds of 
the judges gave the right (deliberative) answer to 
one or more of the three CRT questions, confirming 
a significant reliance on System 1 (intuitive) thinking 
in the remaining responses. Of course, these results 
are not generalizable as to how judges think in 
courtroom practice. Nevertheless, the CRT may have 
been a useful exercise in encouraging the judges to 
be aware of and to regulate their thinking, in 
particular metacognition, the executive function that 
turns on their System 2 thinking that can, among 
other things, expose their cognitive biases. 
The CRT has not, to our knowledge, been tested in 
the medical profession. The aim of this study was to 
evaluate the level of Systems 1 and 2 thinking in 
medical students using the CRT. Since the 
development of clinical expertise is often associated 
with more automatic System 1 thinking, we also 
wanted to compare the CRT responses of students in 
clinical practice (“experts”) and those in pre-clinical 
years (“novices”). We also wished to test the 
question progression improvement phenomenon 
and the possible gender bias seen above.
21
 Although 
not a specific aim of this study, we believe the CRT 
test, when used with students, can help them 
understand the differences between intuitive and 
analytical thinking in decision making in clinical 
practice. 
Methods  
The assessment tool used in this study was the 
internationally validated CRT, originally developed as 
a measure of a type of cognitive ability.
24
 The 
questions, along with the intuitive (incorrect) and 
the analytical (correct) answers, are as follows:  
CRT question 1: This question required respondents 
to evaluate the cost of a ball given that the total cost 
of a bat and a ball was $1.10 and the bat cost $1.00 
more than the ball. An intuitive (impulsive) answer 
that the ball costs $0.10 does spring to mind by 
subtracting $1.00 from $1.10. However, should this 
be the case, the total cost of the bat and ball would 
be $1.20, which is incorrect. Hence, the right answer 
is $0.05. 
CRT question 2: This question asks respondents to 
evaluate, if 5 machines take 5 minutes to make 5 
widgets, how long does is take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets. Again, the impulsive answer that 
springs to mind is 100 minutes, but if one were to 
take a step back and consider, it would take 1 
machine 5 minutes to make 1 widget. Therefore, it 
would take 100 machines 5 minutes to make 100 
widgets. 
CRT question 3: This question gave the background 
of a lily patch in a pond. Each day the lily patch 
doubled in size. It takes 48 days for the lily patch to 
cover the entire pond and respondents are asked 
how long it would take for the lily pad to cover half 
the pond. The intuitive answer would be to take the 
half of 48 (day 24), but logically, if the patch were to 
double in size every day, the day before it covers the 
entire lake it would cover half the lake (day 47).  
Thus the correct answers are, in summary, 5, 5 and 
47, while the intuitive answers are 10, 100 and 24, 
respectfully. 
After obtaining ethical approval from Research 
Ethics Committee of the Cork Teaching Hospitals, 
medical students in the School of Medicine, 
University College Cork, from Years 2 & 3 (pre-
clinical), and Years 4 (in clinical practice) of a 5-year 
Canadian Medical Education Journal 2016, 7(2) 
e100 
 
Medical Degree course were approached to 
participate in this study. The CRT was distributed to 
students at the end of a lecture, thus allowing them 
10-15 minutes to complete the CRT, in addition to a 
few demographic questions. A voluntarily completed 
response was taken to indicate consent for 
participation. Respondents were assured that 
participation was anonymous and would have no 
bearing on their future medical education. Statistical 
analysis was by student t-test for continuous data 
and Spearman rank correlation to test the 
association between ranked variables.  
Results 
There were approximately 90 students in the pre-
clinical and 90 students in clinical class, i.e. 180 
students in total, of whom 130 (72%) completed the 
survey. Two students had previously been exposed 
to the CRT and were excluded. Of the remaining 128 
students, 49 were male and 79 were female, while 
61 were pre-clinical and 67 were clinical students. 
Ten percent of students (13/128) answered none of 
the CRT questions correctly,  21% (27/128) answered 
one correctly, 25% (32/128) answered two questions 
correctly while 44% (56/128) answered all three 
correctly. Over half of respondents (56%) obtained 
the correct (analytical) answer to the first question, 
with 40% giving the intuitive answer. More than two 
thirds of respondents (70%) got the second question 
right, with 22% getting the intuitive answer. For 
question 3, 77% of respondents got the right answer, 
with 14% getting the intuitive answer. The mean 
number of questions answered correctly was 2.02. 
The students returned a total of 388 questions: 67% 
(259) were correct answers, 25% (97) were intuitive 
answers and 8% (32) were incorrect answers. 
The outcomes from the individual three questions, 
by pre-clinical and clinical students, are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 1. The percentage of correct 
answers increased as the questions progressed from 
question 1 to 3. At the same time, the percentage of 
intuitive answers decreased, while incorrect 
responses ranged between 3 to 13%. 
Table 1. Responses to the CRT questions by pre-
clinical students and students in clinical practice 
 
 
Correct 
Answer 
% (n) 
System 1 
intuitive or 
“impulsive” 
Answer 
%  (n) 
Incorrect 
Answer 
 
% (n) 
Total 
Question 1 
Pre-Clinical 65 (39) 30 (18) 5  (3) 100 
Clinical 49 (33) 49 (33) 3  (2) 100 
Question 2 
Pre-Clinical 73 (49) 15 (10) 12 (8) 100 
Clinical 65 (40) 30 (18) 5   (3) 100 
Question 3 
Pre-Clinical 84 (56) 10 (7) 6   (8) 100 
Clinical 69 (42) 18 (11) 13 (8) 100 
 
Figure 1. Correct answers increased and intuitive 
answers decreased in both pre-clinical and clinical 
students as they progressed from question 1 to 3 
 
Pre-clinical respondents gave 5-10% more correct 
and 2-10% less intuitive answers than their clinical 
counterparts for each question (Figure 1). However, 
pairwise analysis of the means showed no significant 
differences between pre-clinical and clinical 
respondents.  
Approximately 9% (11/128) of respondents were 
international students who did not have English as a 
childhood language. There was a significant 
difference between the mean number of correct 
answers of students who had English as a childhood 
language (2.12, n = 117) and those who did not (1.0, 
n = 11: t test; p < 0.01). Conversely, respondents 
who were non-native English speakers gave 
significantly more intuitive answers (1.6, n = 11) than 
English speakers (0.7, n = 117: t test; p < 0.01). There 
1 2 3
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
Q u e s tio n
P
e
r
c
e
n
ta
g
e
 %
P re -c lin ic a l In tu it iv e
C lin ic a l In tu it iv e
P re -c lin ic a l C o r re c t
C lin ic a l C o r re c t
Canadian Medical Education Journal 2016, 7(2) 
e101 
 
was no relationship between age of respondents, or 
gender of respondents (male n = 49 and female n = 
79) and correct (72% vs 65%), intuitive (23% vs 27%) 
or incorrect (5% vs 8%) answers, respectively. 
Discussion 
The CRT is designed to measure the ability of 
respondents to activate thinking processes that 
switch to System 2 thinking where System 1 (more 
intuitive) thinking might lead them astray. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to test the CRT on 
medical students. Our study confirmed that less than 
half (44%) of the medical students answered all 
three questions correctly (i.e. were fully 
metacognitive in engaging System 2 thinking) while 
one in 10 students answered none of the questions 
right (suggesting they did not think metacognitively 
to engage System 2 thinking and generally relied on 
intuitive thinking). Thus, more than half of the 
students demonstrated full or partial reliance on 
intuitive thinking in responding to these analytical 
questions.  
A minority of students (< 13%) had incorrect answers 
that were neither the analytical nor the intuitive 
responses.  It is possible that these students may 
have recognized they should switch from System 1 
thinking (i.e. they activated some metacognitive 
processes), but were unsuccessful in their System 2 
thinking. Using focus groups to ask participants to 
explain the manner in which they went about solving 
each question would have answered this 
conundrum. However, this was outside the scope of 
the current study but a useful direction for further 
research. Finally, a small number of students in this 
study did not have English as a childhood language 
and had lower correct responses. A lower level of 
functioning in the English language may have 
affected their score due to a less accurate sense of 
the situations being described in the problems.  
As was seen in Frederick’s studies and also in the 
present study, System 2 responses increased and 
System 1 answers decreased with progression 
through the CRT questions.
24
 According to Frederick, 
the first question is commonly regarded as the 
easiest and the third, the hardest. Thus, when 
confronted with problems of a harder nature, 
respondents use their System 2 processes to 
override their System 1 intuitive processes to obtain 
the correct answer. Fredrick found that men scored 
higher than women on the CRT. He postulated that 
men, supposedly having more learned skills in 
mathematics, were less likely to go with the intuitive 
responses.
24
 We found no gender differences in the 
CRT scores in our study; however, it was not 
powered enough to show a significant difference if 
one existed.  
The CRT is a test of cognition and care must be taken 
not to interpret these results as an index of the 
medical students’ current or future clinical 
reasoning. Performance on a math problem has 
relatively low stakes compared with health care 
decision-making.  Low scoring students may have 
faulty mathematical intuition based on the CRT, but 
there is no evidence as yet to say they have faulty 
intuition in general, particularly medical intuition. It 
may be of interest in a future study to link CRT 
responses to subsequent clinical decision-making. 
However, it is most unlikely that a single 
mathematical examination such as the CRT could 
predict future performance in clinical reasoning and 
judgment. Instead, as it stands, we believe the test 
can be used to help students understand the 
differences between analytic and intuitive thinking, 
the importance of both systems thinking, and 
especially the need to develop their metacognitive 
skills. In addition, using the CRT and answering the 
questions correctly, has been shown to activate 
System 2 processes and may help prepare students 
for metacognitive thinking.
26
 
The objective of the present study was not to make 
correlations or reach conclusions that mathematical 
reasoning predicts or facilitates diagnostic decision-
making. However, we observed that students in pre-
clinical years demonstrated some evidence of more 
cognitive override (metacognition) than students in 
clinical practice although this was not statistically 
significant. The intuitive answers for the CRT 
mathematical problems were intrinsically incorrect. 
In medical practice, intuitive responses are not 
always wrong. In their work on intuition Tracy et al
15
 
stated that: “There was overwhelming agreement 
that intuition plays a vital role in the practice of 
family medicine” and that “intuition has its origins in 
personal clinical experience.” Intuition may also be 
adaptive in complex situations where decisions are 
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required in a timely fashion; for instance, intuitive 
responses are essential in emergency situations.  
Nevertheless, where possible, intuition should be 
guided and formed by System 2 thinking to reduce 
the possibility of error or cognitive biases. 
The CRT has previously been used at an educational 
session at the Florida Conference of Circuit Judges in 
2006.
25
 The medical students in the present study 
scored higher than the judges, correctly answering a 
mean of 2.02 of the CRT questions compared to 1.23 
for the judges. The judges were also more likely to 
respond with intuitive responses, in that only two 
thirds of the judges (compared to 90% of the 
medical students), gave the right (deliberative) 
answer to one or more of the CRT questions. There 
were a number of differences between the studies, 
however, that caution direct comparisons. The CRT 
questions in the Judges’ study were embedded 
within a larger questionnaire that was administered 
over 45 minutes. In contrast, the medical student 
questionnaire consisted of the 3 CRT questions and a 
number of demographic questions that was 
administered over 10-15 minutes between lecture 
slots.  
There were a number of limitations in this study. It 
was only possible to distribute it to a relatively small 
number of students between lectures on a couple of 
occasions as multiple attempts would have affected 
the reliability of the results, through spill-over of the 
content and answers of CRT questions to other 
students. We did not include final year medical 
students because they were dispersed throughout 
the various teaching hospitals and were not 
accessible in a large group. There may be alternative 
reasons, other than better analytical skills, why some 
students scored higher System 2 responses than 
others. For instance, although we specifically asked 
students if they were previously aware of the CRT 
problems and excluded them if they answered in the 
affirmative, it is possible that some may have prior 
experience in similar kinds of mathematical 
problems and may therefore have found the CRT 
problems to be quite straightforward. This CRT test 
had only three questions; Frederick
27
 has used up to 
eight CRT problems in some studies, which may 
result in greater reliability. Ideally, we believe that 
the CRT test should have been followed up by a 
debrief where students could have explored the 
purpose of the test, the differences between 
Systems 1 and 2 thinking, the role of metacognition, 
and the importance of knowing how our minds think 
as novices, as experts, and in times of distress. 
Finally there is a need for ongoing research, 
including non-mathematical critical thinking tests, to 
assess the development of analytic and logical 
reasoning skills of medical students and emerging 
doctors over time.  
The CRT mathematical test has shown that intuition 
is a dominant force in the minds of medical students. 
It has also shown that it is possible for this intuitive 
force to be put aside and for logic to prevail even as 
the CRT questions progress. Awareness and 
understanding of how experts think, in addition to 
intuition and metacognitive training, should be 
promoted amongst medical students as a way to aid 
their thinking processes and avoid cognitive errors in 
subsequent clinical practice. Finally, students need 
to understand how faulty or lazy thinking can lead to 
cognitive errors that can impact upon patient care 
and patient safety.  
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